James Longstreet and the American Civil War by Harold M. Knudsen;

Author:Harold M. Knudsen;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Casemate Publishers & Book Distributors, LLC
Published: 2022-03-15T00:00:00+00:00

1 Fremantle, “Diary,” 338-340; Wert, Longstreet, 422-423. On July 7, 1863, McLaws confided in a letter to his wife: “I think the attack was unnecessary and the whole plan of battle a very bad one. Genl Longstreet is to blame for not reconnoitering the ground and for persisting in ordering the assault when his errors were discovered.” McLaws was mistaken, in that it was Lee’s plan and he had sent a captain to reconnoiter the area before telling Longstreet they would attack the Union Line. Longstreet tried to dissuade Lee from fighting at Gettysburg as well as attacking the Union Line. McLaws continued: “During the engagement he was very excited, giving contrary orders to everyone, and was exceedingly overbearing. I consider him a humbug—a man of small capacity, very obstinate, not at all chivalrous, exceedingly conceited, and totally selfish. If I can it is my intention to get away from his command.” McLaws was clearly upset about Longstreet not stopping the attack, leading part of his division in an attack, and having apparently been hard on him. However, McLaws was not among those who later claimed Longstreet had disobeyed Lee. McLaws supported Longstreet after the war. See Lafayette McLaws’s letter to wife, “A Series of Terrible Engagements,” in, The Civil War: The Third Year, ed. Brooks D. Simpson.

2 Freeman, R. E. Lee, 2: 317-349. As covered in earlier chapters, the close relationship between Lee and Longstreet began within a few days of meeting each other after Lee took over from Johnston. Longstreet became his co-planner, Lee stayed with Longstreet, and it is also evident they got along well personally. Lee recognized Longstreet’s long, consistent service, and infantry expertise. In theory, it is possible that in 1861 Lee was dissatisfied with his early performance in West Virginia, and once he had army-level command he overcompensated with aggressiveness as he went through a period of late-career education, learning the true capabilities of the combat arms branches in 1862 and 1863. Aggressiveness brought success, but at a high cost. Malvern Hill, for example, shows where the aggressiveness went too far, and perhaps Lee then sought the infantry expertise of Longstreet at Second Manassas. At Antietam and Gettysburg he listened but ultimately went with his own judgments.

3 For information on Lee’s prewar military career, consult Margaret Sanborn, Robert E. Lee: A Portrait 1807-1861, (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1966), 237-317.

4 Freeman, R.E. Lee, 1: 360-418. Freeman was critical of Longstreet in his 1930s four-volume biography, regarding this role. It must be noted that Freeman was not a soldier and had no career understanding of Army branch professional development and how a career path determines an officer’s suitability for high-level combat arms command positions. Freeman assumed Lee was proficient in combat arms branch tactics at a level equal to or greater than those who were combat arms officers. This is a fallacy, perhaps proven at least in two major battles: his failed and costly attack against a defense-in-depth at Malvern Hill, and at Gettysburg.

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